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Gender, a useful category (to guide policies)?
Gênero, uma categoria útil
(para orientar políticas)?
Wilza Vieira Villela 4
Pedro Paulo Gomes Pereira 4
To discuss the ideas of Márcia Thereza Couto and
Romeu Gomes with regard to public policies for
male health is an honor and a pleasure. Apart from
the topicality of the theme, the piece touches on
points which deal both with contemporary social
theory and with political reality. According to the
authors, the persistence among men of higher ill-
ness and mortality rates through preventable causes,
in contrast to their greater social power in relation
to women, demands to be faced and understood
through the use of the category of gender, both on
an explanatory level and in guiding public health
policies.
In seeking to reflect with Couto and Gomes on
the gaps which open up when a concept is translat-
ed into concrete action and with socio-historical
limitations, we took the article as a kind of call to
action, which has produced in us further queries,
in so far as the text affected us and led in an indirect
way to more general questions.
1. A first query concerns the broad use, by public
policies and studies in the field of health, of the
concept of gender formulated by Joan W. Scott1 in
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her article Gender: a useful category of historical
analysis, of 1986, in which gender is defined as “a
constituent element in social relationships based
on the perceived differences between the sexes.” This
broad use ignores the later work of the author who,
in 2010, uneasy with the way in which her thesis
had been appropriated, questioned it in the article:
Gender: still a useful category of historical analysis?2
Her criticism refers to the use of gender as a rein-
vented synonym for woman, sex, sexual roles and
to its use as a reply or label, rather than in a ques-
tioning mode. The domestication of the potential-
ly critical nature of the concept is also found in the
reification of the binary character of gender, de-
spite the warning of Scott2 that gender is not re-
ducible to awareness of a supposed male or fe-
male. In the same way, the term “perceived differ-
ences” is frequently taken as a fact of human life,
obscuring the fact that the radical nature of gender
consists in showing that the standards by which
beings are perceived are, equally, ways by which
gender is produced. The difference therefore is not
a fact on which perception is based, because such
perception operates within discursive regimes which
organize bodies into dimorphic binary concepts. It
is therefore right that we should reflect on the freez-
ing and petrification of the concept of gender and
seek to break with a grammar which operates in a
binary manner, reducing the diverse forms of pro-
duction of differences and inequalities and their
interpositions. However, would it be possible for
public policies to follow another grammar? Would
not the terms “men’s health” or “women’s health,”
which give their names to policies, be indicating an
assumed universality of subjects to anchor policies
of a universalizing nature, without translating the
complex power relationships which grow up
among the various subjects on the basis of social
class, race/ethnic identity, sexual orientation and
corporal performance, as Couto and Gomes sug-
gest, explicitly and in refusing, throughout the text,
to use the terms “man” and “woman” in the singu-
lar? Although recognizing the need for stable, albe-
it provisory, concepts in order to be able to oper-
ate, would not public policies, in making use of a
binary and hetero-normative grammar, themselves
be ways of regulating and controlling the subjects
towards whom they are directed?
2. The category of gender arose during discus-
sions on women as historical subjects, in the search
to question the universality attributed to men.
Considered on the basis of social relationships
based on the perceived differences between the sex-
es which commenced within power relationships,
the interpretation of the relationship between sex
and gender presupposed the priority of sex, class-
ing it as a pre-discursive element, and it was not
long before this approach led to criticisms by fem-
inist authors. The recognition of the historical char-
acter of sex permitted the claim that sex is a discur-
sive result and that gender constituted sex. Gender
does not bear the same relationship to culture as
sex does to nature, and it would be necessary to
dispute any conceptions which suggested some sort
of stability for gender. This theoretical perspective
led Judith Butler3 to define gender as performance,
a set of corporal practices and habits which place
the subject within a given relationship. The perfor-
mative nature of gender is an effect of the discourse
– sex consists in an effect of gender. The discursive
rules of normative heterosexuality produce gender
performances, and the actual sexualization of bod-
ies derives from such performances. So that nei-
ther gender nor sex are permanent substances.
When Butler3,4 redefined gender as performance
and performativity, she questioned the production
and reproduction of the normative and binary sys-
tem of sex/gender, concluding that, just as sex and
sexuality are not an expression of self or of an iden-
tity, but effects of a discourse with regard to sex,
gender is also not an expression of sex. If feminin-
ity is not necessarily and naturally a cultural con-
struction by a female body; if masculinity is not
necessarily and naturally a cultural construction
by a male body; if masculinity is not glued to men
nor a privilege of those biologically defined as such,
it is because sex does not limit gender, and gender
may exceed the limits of female/male binarism. In
abolishing the immediate link between men and
masculinity, the question arises as to what is mas-
culinity and what is a man, and the reason for
the persistent link between the two terms. Howev-
er, how are policies to be formulated without a
presumption of masculinity and femininity defined
by a grammar revolving around hetero-norma-
tive meanings? Is it possible to speak of “gender
equality” without embracing the multiplicity of
bodies and desires? And if it is in terms of hetero-
normative grammar that “male domination” arose,
is it possible to speak of “gender equality” within
such a grammar?
3. In the case of policies for male health, the
debate the argument with regard to genderized re-
lationships seems unanswerable, given that such
relationships are thought of as intimately related
to questions of gender, “the explanatory matrix of
the determining factors in the health-sickness pro-
cess and healthcare for men.” Put another way,
hegemonic masculinity, linked to homophobic and
heterosexual ideas of virility which construct and
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underpin identity and male domination, prove re-
sistant to biomedical prescription, to the promo-
tion of health and self-care. Now that “certain
models of masculinity can involve commitments
to male health,” it is necessary to have health strat-
egies which take into account the genderized ways
of acting and relating on the part of these individ-
uals. Thus health policies have concentrated on
showing the vulnerability of men, attempting to
make them conscious of this vulnerability, so as to
then medicalize it – thereby promoting standard-
ization. The assumption that hegemonic mascu-
linity, despite presenting itself as universal or neu-
tral, could potentially be pathological, brings us to
another line of questioning: is it possible to talk of
“men’s health” without it representing a form of
medicalization? To what extent does the use of a
standardized and fossilized conception of gender
act as a device for controlling male bodies? What is
being left out with a policy which defines “men” on
the basis of a naturalized and reductive conception
of gender? If the forms of male domination which
cause harm to men and women are linked to an
ideal of virility, to heterosexuality and to homopho-
bia, how is it possible to posit a public policy which
challenges these values when this very policy is es-
tablished on the basis of the same grammar of
gender, the same hetero-normative assumptions
which underpin hegemonic masculinity?
4. “What concerns me is when the definitions
take gender as a familiar methodology, instead of a
form of questioning,” said Scott1,2. But, when gen-
der is an open question, it is then a useful category,
she concludes, stressing, therefore, the questioning
and the need for gender to be an opening. Only in
this way can gender be useful and not a form of
standardization. It is here perhaps that we find the
key to taking the dialogue forward with regard to
the problems and dilemmas dealt with in the text
proposed for debate. To refine our understanding
of the different forms of oppression and exclusion,
so as to identify them even in proposals for health-
care, if the concepts which guide them have been
absorbed, instead of being “forms of questioning.”
Here, perhaps, is an alternative, not in answer to
the questions that the text raises, but in order to
formulate new questions. Without being prescrip-
tive, perhaps we can continue to question and iden-
tify problems, maintaining the opening proposed
for gender – as seems to be indicated by Scott1,2,
and by Couto and Gomes, whom we once more
thank for the opportunity to join in the dialogue.
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